The African Standby Force is a key institution for the implementation of the
Introduction
The call for the establishment of a continent wide military force in Africa began well ahead of the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in
1963.
1 Already in 1961 the Casablanca group led by Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, called for the establishment of an African High Command primarily to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the newly independent African States (Legum 1963: 187-188) . However, the majority of the Nkrumah's proposal, which implicitly posed a threat to states' sovereignty, was met with strong opposition from majority of OAU members. Nkrumah, however, attempted to water down the opposition by arguing that the African High
Command would only intervene in the internal conflicts subject to the invitation of the government of the host state (Zdenek 1969:72) . Nonetheless, many OAU member states looked at Nkrumah's proposal with suspicion because of his radical views and high ambition for a politically strong African unity. Eventually, OAU member states rejected Nkrumah's second proposal for an African High
Command. The idea of establishing an Africa-wide security force was not realised under the OAU. Nevertheless, a number of propositions that include the establishment of an African Task Force and a Collective Intervention Force were made by OAU member states and officials across the years. 
ASF mission scenarios and time of deployment
Based on the mandate of the ASF, the ASF Policy provides 6 scenarios for the ASF (See Table 1 ). Normally the ASF will deploy complete brigades (either singly or more than one), especially in response to Scenarios 4,5,6 (AU peacekeeping force for Chapter VI, preventive deployments, multidimensional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI, preventive deployments, multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, and AU interventions). This would involve the AU HQ, Regional organisations and ASF regional brigades and their Planning Elements (PLANELMS). b. Scenarios 3, 4, 5, &6: Delegated Single-Brigade Deployment. A circumstance may arise whereby a Regional Organisation is mandated by the AU to meet the demands of Scenarios 3, 4, 5, 6. Again this is consistent with the vision of the ASF to deploy integrated brigades. This reflects what has happened in the past and will likely happen in the future. e. Scenarios 4 & 6: Lead Nation: Scenarios 4 and 6 missions that might require a nation to take the lead because of the urgency of the situation. The African Mission in Burundi is a good example where a nation agreed to take the lead. However, the development of the ASF with its regional structures will reduce the occasions when the lead nation concept is used. 
ASF doctrine and training for mission scenario six
The development of a doctrine for all ASF operations is primarily done at the AU level. In this regard the ASF Policy provides that 'the AU should consult closely with the UN to gain access to the latest UN peace operations doctrine and The above quotation underscores the developing AU doctrine on military intervention inside member states to pre-empt or bring to halt the commission of include the respect for the sovereignty of the occupied territory, the duty to restore and ensure public order, the duty to limit the occupation and the duty to allow access to international humanitarian organisations. 9 While humanitarian law and human rights law contain different sets of rules, there are areas of convergence between the two. The convergence between humanitarian law and human rights law is stronger in 'such matters as the right to life; the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary 8 See for instance Andreas Zimmermann, 'Preliminary Remarks on para.2(c)-(f) and para.3', page 264 on the characterisation of international armed conflict; see also Daphna Shraga (1996) page 333: 'In the legal literature, however, it has been the prevalent view that the law applicable to the United Nations forces engaged in internal conflicts should, to some extent at least, be the law governing international armed conflicts.' 9 See Hague Regulations (1907), articles 42-56; the Fourth Geneva Convention, articles 27-34 and articles 47-78. arrest or detention; discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language, or religion;
and due process of law' (Meron 2000: 266) .
The application of human rights law is more apparent when the ASF is in occupation where the rights of the population need to be respected and protected by the ASF military and civilian personnel. The need to train ASF intervention forces in human rights (both civilian and military components) can not be emphasised enough. In the past it has been observed that the human rights 
Conclusion
The operational dimension of the use of force under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act highly depends on the capability of the ASF. The Peace and Security Council Protocol and the ASF Policy have recognised military intervention under Article 4 (h) as one mission scenario for the ASF. However, the ASF Policy has also adopted the lead nation concept to secure entry points in military intervention under Article 4(h) to be followed by contingents of the ASF.
The lack of single states militarily and economically capable to implement the single nation concept is a big challenge. In the long run the ASF capability should be enhanced to fully carry out military intervention under Article 4(h) without reliance on a lead nation. However, the timetable for the establishment of the ASF does not show the AU plan and time framework to develop its capabilities to fully carry out intervention missions under Article 4(h).
The most pressing problem that may cripple the whole ASF system is the absence of sustainable funding system. Funding is very crucial for all activities ranging from management, training to deployment of the ASF. The ASF can not depend on voluntary contributions from donors. Neither can it be dependent upon unreliable sources that fail to materialise. The effort to establish a sustainable system of funding the ASF should be a top priority to the AU, sub-regional organisations, and member states. The AU may go beyond the continent in securing some form of arrangement with other international and regional organisations which can support the ASF effort in a predictable manner.
However, the primary responsibility to provide the ASF with predictable and sustainable source of funding rests on the shoulder of member states of the AU. 
